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PAUL A. LEBEL 
Protecting the Right 
to Criticize Government: A Proposal 
for a Symmetry of Defamation Privileges 
PARTICIPATORY democracy, particularly when 
practiced on the local level, depends on the existence 
of a populace willing to be both infonned and en-
gaged. The private citizen who is sufficiently inter-
ested in or concerned about the activities of govern-
ment to attend and to speak at meetings of govern-
mental bodies plays a number of important roles-
watchdog, critic, surrogate for segments of the pop-
ulation not in attendance, sounding board for the 
public officials who convene the meeting, even poten-
tial candidate for public office. Because of the signifi-
cance of the participation of a private citizen in 
governmental affairs, legal rules and principles that 
could act as a disincentive to such participation ought 
to be scrutinized closely, and such rules should be 
forced to bear a substantial justificatory burden. 
Among the attitudes with which one should approach 
such rules is a receptiveness to refonn proposals that 
alleviate the deterrence to participation without creat-
ing significant substantive or administrative prob-
lems of their own. 
It is the dual thesis of this article that the potential 
for defamation litigation against a private citizen 
who speaks out about government could act as such a 
disincentive, and that a fairly simple tort refonn 
measure can go a long way toward removing or reduc-
ing that deterrent effect. A brief statement of the 
mesh of constitutional and common law rules of def. 
amation will provide a basis for both an understand-
ing of the nature of the problem and an appreciation 
of the merits of the proposal offered here for alleviat-
ing the problem. 
The Problem: Insufficient Protection 
for the Critic of Government 
The United States Supreme Court's decision twenty-
three years ago in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan! 
transformed the law of defamation from a common 
law strict liability tort to an action in which constitu-
tional principles now often require a showing of a 
particular kind of fault-as-to-falsity, the misnamed 
"actual malice" of the Sullivan decision. 2 Under the 
regime of constitutional rules derived from Sullivan 
and its progeny,3 a defamation plaintiff who can be 
characterized as a public official or a public figure 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defamatory communication was made under circum-
stances that show that the defendant either knew the 
material was false or published the material with 
reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. 4 
Absent such a showing by the plaintiff, a defendant 
who has published defamatory material about a pub-
lic plaintiff is deemed to be entitled to a constitutional 
protection from liability. 
One might object to the shape of the current law of 
defamation, and from different perspectives might 
contend that its line of development would have been 
better if the Supreme Court had been either more re-
strictive or more expansive in its recognition of the 
First Amendment privilege beginning in the Sullivan 
case. An important range of issues surrounds the 
question of how far beyond the core of the Sullivan 
fact pattern the specific type of constitutional protec-
tion recognized in that case ought to be extended.5 
Those issues, significant though they are, lie outside 
the scope of this article, for the problem presented by 
the potential liability of the citizen-critic of govern-
ment is squarely within that Sullivan core. An exam-
ination of this problem reveals that, however well-
intentioned the thrust of the Sullivan opinion, the 
solution adopted by the Supreme Court in that case 
fails to provide adequate protection for the critic of 
government. 
The central concern of the Sullivan decision was 
the manner in which a civil action for defamation 
could be analogized to the criminal prosecution for 
seditious libel.6 In the hands of a public official, the 
defamation lawsuit could be an effective means of sti-
fling criticism of official conduct. 7 Instead of deciding 
that criticism of public officials was absolutely privi-
leged,8 the Court created a qualified or conditional 
constitutional privilege that could be defeated only by 
clear and convincing evidence of "actual malice."9 
The goal of the Sullivan court-to create a "brea-
thing space" within which vigorous and robust 
debate about matters of public concern could take 
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placelu-is served only indirectly by the rules adopted 
in that decision, through what might be seen as a 
false target approach . Rejecting the argument in 
favor of recognizing a constitutional immunity for 
speech about official conduct, the Court was neverthe-
less unwilling to allow the difference between truth 
and falsity to serve as the determinant of liability uel 
non. I I The critical issue of "actual malice" -whether 
there was known or reckless falsity in what was pub-
lished about the plaintiff-was developed as a "safer" 
basis for determining liability, an issue that could be 
left to judicial factfinders with a greater assurance of 
reliable and accurate conclusions than would be the 
case if the decision were to be solely on the truth or 
falsity of the material. 12 The expectation of the Sulli-
van majority apparently was that anyone wishing to 
say something about the official conduct of a public 
official would be undeterred by a libel standard that 
made liability turn on the one thing that the publisher 
could control, that is, the publisher's own state of 
mind regarding the truth or falsity of the communi-
cation. 
There is a degree of naivete in the Sul/iuan opinion 
that makes the decision less compelling as the source 
of a rule of law than it may be as an expression of 
political aspirations. I:) While it is true that the avoi-
dance of liability for defamation of public officials 
would no longer be permitted to turn solely on the 
ability of a puhlisher to persuade a jury of the truth of 
the published matter, the post-Sullivan critic of offi-
cial conduct would still be subject to litigation on the 
issue of whether that critic published known or reck-
lessly false statements about the plaintiff. To suppose 
that the constitutional protections afforded to the 
defamation defendant by the Sullivan opinion would 
remove the deterrent effect of the law of defamation is 
to fail to perceive the extent to which the fact or even 
the threat of litigation can be as powerful a weapon 
against a critic as would be the ultimate imposition of 
liability itself.'! 
One might contend that the defamation defendants 
best served hy the Sullivan rules are those media enti-
ties that have the resources and the professional 
interest in resisting defamation claims to the fullest. 
With effective legal counsel either in-house or on call, 
and with a fairly high stake in establishing and 
maintaining the credibility of its publishing enter-
prise, such a defendant may very well receive from 
the Sullivan opinion just the assurance that the Court 
wanted to create. Sulliuan ignores, and the Sullivan 
progeny have not adequately protected, those poten-
tial critics of government officials who have neither 
the resources nor the institutional stake in the out-
come that would make worthwhile the costly and 
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often emotionally draining litigation of a defamation 
claim. Understanding that the prospects of actually 
being liabl e to the person whose conduct one wants to 
criticize are fairly low may be less than totally reas-
suring to someone who also understands that the sub-
ject of the criticism has it within his or her power to 
drag the critic in to the expensive and risky arena of a 
defamation lawsuit. 
If the deterrent effect of defamation litigation actu-
ally does pose a problem for critics of government, one 
could further suppose that the problem is greatest at 
the lower levels of government. The severity of the 
adverse effects is enhanced for at least two reasons: 
first, critics at the lower levels of government are less 
likely to have the resources or the inclination to fight 
defamation claims, and second, the necessity for 
ordinary citizens' vigilance and outspoken discussion 
of government cond uct at this level is arguably even 
greater than it is at higher levels. When the President 
of the United States engages in wrongdoing, we can 
take some comfort from the fact that institutions such 
as the Washington Post will serve as a watchdog. 
When a city councilor a county board of supervisors 
is about to act, the most effecti ve check on those local 
officials may be the private citizen with sufficient 
knowledge and concern to speak out. At this level, 
even the media entity which has the resources to 
defend a defamation claim may have to rely primar-
ily on information from individuals who would them-
selves be subject to the deterrent effect hypothesized 
here. 
The Solution: A Symmetry of Privilege 
If the state of affairs just outlined is a matter of 
legitimate concern, as I believe it is, what can be done 
about it? One solution-leave it to the United States 
Supreme Court as a matter of interpretation of the 
federal constitution-seems to be both short-sighted 
and unproductive. While recent defamation decisions 
of the Court do not call for the cries of anguish issued 
from some quarters of the media, their lawyers, and 
other critics of the Court, neither is it realistic to 
expect the Court to be inclined to extend significantly 
beyond their current borders the constitutional pro-
tections already recognized. I." If reform is to be effec-
tive, it must occur at the state level. I will outline in 
the remainder of this article the basic contours of a 
solution to the problem I have described, and then 
point out the multiple options that exist for the 
implementation of this solution. In this way, the right 
to criticize government can be given greater protec-
tion than it currently enjoys by virtue of the federal 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. 
The fundamental reform that needs to be put into 
place can be described as a principle of symmetry of 
privilege. Understanding the nature and the opera-
tion of this principle requires an appreciation of a set 
of privileges that do not depend on the Sullivan line of 
cases for their provenance. Although the privileges 
created as part of the constitutional law of defama-
tion may receive the most attention today, a separate 
set of common law privileges has existed in one form 
or another since well before the United States Supreme 
Court's initial efforts toward the constitutionalization 
of this tort action in 1964. These common law privi-
leges can be identified and distinguished in two ways: 
first, on the basis of their origin, and second, on the 
basis of their strength. Privileges may arise as a 
result of what is being said-content privileges-as 
well as who is saying it-status privileges. The 
strength of the privilege may be either absolute or 
qualified. The combination of a privilege of a particu-
lar origin with a particular strength determines the 
scope of the common law protection from liability for 
defamatory falsehoods. 
The privileges that are relevant to the problem 
addressed here are those that attach to a person by 
virtue of the public office he or she holds. For a va-
riety of legitimate reasons, many public officials are 
granted an absolute immunity from defamation claims 
based on statements that are made in the course of 
their duties. A matter of constitutional import for fed-
eral and state legislators under the constitutional 
"speech and debate" clauses,ll> these privileges have 
been extended by common law to officials in the judi-
cial and executive branches of government. The abso-
lute immunity enjoyed by a public official means that 
once the occasion for the privilege is established, a 
defamation claim based on that statement must be 
dismissed, without any further inquiry into the 
motives, the good faith, or the fault-as-to-falsity ofthe 
person making the statement. 
A recent decision of the Circuit Court for the Sev-
enth Judicial Circuit, in Newport News, illustrates 
the operation of the relevant privilege, and serves as a 
nice model for explaining the symmetrical privilege 
advocated here. An attorney whose clients challenged 
a proposed city ordinance banning topless dancing 
appeared before the Newport News City Council and 
stated that he had affidavits placing two members of 
the council at parties where such entertainment had 
occurred. One of the council members so accused 
responded with the statement that the attorney was a 
liar. 'TWo days later, the attorney sued the council 
member for defamation.17 Circuit Judge Douglas M. 
Smith recently dismissed the action, 1 ~ ruling that 
members of the city council were protected by an 
absolute privilege. 19 Judge Smith's decision with 
regard to the privilege of the council member is emi-
nently defensible both as a matter of law and as a 
matter of sound public policy. 20 
The problem being considered by this article would 
be encountered in what might be described as the 
"flip side" of the lawsuit that was actually filed as a 
result of this incident. Suppose that, instead of the 
attorney suing the city council member, the council-
man had sued the attorney for the statements made 
about the councilman. In that situation, the attorney 
would have had the protection of the constitutional 
privileges flowing from the Sullivan decision, but as 
mentioned earlier, that protection consists only of a 
qualified or a conditional privilege. If the councilman 
could prove that the attorney knew that the allega-
tions were false or that the attorney was reckless with 
regard to the truth or falsity of the allegations, the 
constitutional privilege recognized in Sullivan would 
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be defeated. Even if the councilman were unable to 
make the showing of knowing or reckless falsity, 
defending the lawsuit could pose a substantial finan-
eial and emotional burden to the person who spoke 
out at the council meeting, particularly in a situation 
in which the speaker is not an attorney, and thus is 
likely to view the prospect of litigation with greater 
trepidation. 
The consideration of this relatively uncomplicated 
fact situation reveals the asymmetrical nature of the 
privileges that operate in this setting. The council-
man as a defamation defendant enjoys an absolute 
privilege, while the person who addresses the council 
has, as a defamation defendant, only a qualified priv· 
ilege. Although the ultimate result may turn out to be 
the same in both cases, and neither defamation law-
suit may succeed, it is at least plausible to assume 
that the prospect of having to defend such a lawsuit 
with only the protection of a qualified privilege may 
act as deterrent to someone who has either informa-
tion to present or an opinion to express at a meeting 
of a local governmental body. 
That deterrent effect can be removed by the recog-
nition of a symmetrical privilege in this situation . 
Under a rule of law establishing this privilege, at any 
time that a statement about a government official is 
made on an occasion on which the official would 
enjoy an ahsolute privilege, the person making the 
statement would also enjoy an absolute privilege. 
Just as the public official's motives, good faith, or 
"actual malice" would not be open to judicial ques-
tioning, so too would the critic of government under 
these circumstances be protected from such judicial 
scrutiny. The privilege proposed here is in that way 
different from, and because it is more protective of 
speech arguably superior to, any common law privi-
lege of "fair comment," which is only a qualified or 
conditional privilege and thus might be defeated by 
the appropriate showing.~l 
Implementing the Solution 
The absolute privilege of government officials is 
either already part of Virginia law or readily infera-
ble from existing cases and constitutional provisions. 
The reform of defamation law advocated in this arti-
cle would simply extend to the critic of government 
the same absolute privilege that would be enjoyed by 
a government official who had made the same or sim-
ilar remarks about the critic on a privileged occasion. 
The remaining question that needs to be addressed is 
the method of implementation of this symmetry of 
defamation privileges. 
One way of developing a solution to the problem 
would be to propose legislative action creating the 
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kind of privilege for government critics proposed here. 
For a variety of reasons, this solution might prove to 
be less desirable than would be a judicial recognition 
of the privilege. As each session of the legislature con· 
firms, reform proposals that address specific and dis· 
crete problems can be caught up in a process in which 
such efforts become entangled in the maneuvers of 
those who have other agendas to serve. ll Further· 
more, despite the presence of so many lawyers in the 
legislature, the careful legislative drafting that is 
designed to deal with a particular problem in a precise 
manner is too often wanting. ~:1 Finally, human nature 
suggests that the least likely of all the proposals to 
move to the top of the legislative agenda is one that 
might be seen as directly contrary to the self.interest 
of government officials . 
If legislative action is arguably not the best way of 
implementing the reform proposal offered here, the 
question then becomes whether the reform can be put 
into place through judicial action. In this case, it 
would seem fairly clear that an affirmative answer 
might be given to that question on at least one of two 
grounds. First, the most plausible method of imple-
mentation of the new symmetrical privilege would be 
the adoption of a common law rule to that effect. Such 
a step would be in keeping with the centuries old 
common law development of the tort of defamation. 
Tort law in general, and the law of defamation in 
particular, is a loss-distribution / risk·allocation mech-
anism which can accommodate the needs and respond 
to the problems of a particular time and place. Should 
the courts decide that the potential deterrent effect on 
critics of government should he eliminated, a com-
mon law tort rule putting into place the privilege out-
lined here would remove that deterrence. 
A court might decide for some reason that the adop· 
tion of a common law rule recogni~jng the privilege 
would not be an appropriate addition to the body of 
defamation law that has already become so heavily 
weighted with constitutional considerations. It might 
also be the case that a court could decide that such a 
privilege is so necessary a part of the law of defama-
tion that it ought to be beyond the reach of modifica· 
tion or elimination by the legislature in the normal 
course of its activities. In either of those two events, 
the free speech guarantee of the state constitution24 
would serve as a hook on which the judicial announce-
ment of the privilege could be hung. Just because the 
United States Supreme Court has apparently run the 
scope of protection under the federal constitution out 
to its limits, there is no reason why the courts of Vir-
ginia should be content with a state constitutional 
guarantee of free speech that is too weak to serve the 
important goal of protecting a citizen 's right to speak 
out in the most important way imaginable in our sys-
tem of government-acting as a critic of the perfor-
mance of government officials-an activity which 
was characterized by the Supreme Court in the Sulli-
van case as nsmg to the level of a duty of citizen-
ship. 2" 
Conclusion 
Participation in open debate about public affairs 
is too important a matter to be subjected to deterrent 
effects from rules of law that can be fairly easily mod-
ified to remove such effects. While this article admit-
tedly provides no more than a sketch of a particular 
problem and a proposed method of solving that prob-
lem, consideration of the issues raised in this article 
may serve to alert members ofthe profession to a need 
to expand the scope of current thinking and debate 
about the blend of federal constitutional and state tort 
law that determines the contours of the contemporary 
law of defamation. Although the last quarter-century 
has seen important and impressive efforts to use the 
federal constitution to promote vigorous discussion of 
public issues, it may well be the case that the momen-
tum is shifting to the arena of state tort law rules. 
Should such a shift occur, it needs to be recognized 
that the purposes underlying the constitutional devel-
opments are not necessarily put in jeopardy, and that 
in fact those purposes may be better served by tort 
rules tailored to particular interests and problems_ 
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